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Abstract—The basic problem of secure bidirectional relaying
involves two users who want to exchange messages via an
intermediate ”honest-but-curious” relay node. There is no direct
link between the users; all communication must take place via
the relay node. The links between the user nodes and the relay
are wireless links with Gaussian noise. It is required that the
users’ messages be kept secure from the relay. In prior work,
we proposed coding schemes based on nested lattices for this
problem, assuming that the channel gains from the two user
nodes to the relay are identical. We also analyzed the power-
rate tradeoff for secure and reliable message exchange using our
coding schemes. In this paper, we extend our prior work to the
case when the channel gains are not necessarily identical, and are
known to the relay node but perhaps not to the users. We show
that using our scheme, perfect secrecy can be obtained only for
certain values of the channel gains, and analyze the power-rate
tradeoff in these cases. We also make similar observations for
our strongly-secure scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lattice codes for Gaussian channels have received a lot of
attention in the recent past. They have been shown to achieve
the capacity of the power-constrained AWGN channel [2], and
have been used with great success for physical layer network
coding for Gaussian networks [8]. They have also been used to
design coding schemes for secure and reliable communication
over the Gaussian wiretap channel [6] and the bidirectional
relay [4], [9]. In this paper, we study secure bidirectional
relaying, where two users A and B want to exchange messages
via an “honest-but-curious” relay R. The relay acts as a passive
eavesdropper, but otherwise conforms to the protocol which it
is asked to follow, i.e., it does not modify or tamper with
the message it has to forward. We also assume that there is
no direct link between the user nodes, and all communication
between A and B must happen via R.
We use the two-phase compute-and-forward protocol [7] for
bidirectional relaying, which we briefly describe here. Let q be
a prime number and m be a positive integer. User nodes A and
B have messages X and Y respectively, which are assumed to
be uniformly distributed over Fmq , where Fq denotes the finite
field with q elements. Let ⊕ denote the addition operation in
Fmq . In the first phase, also called the multiple access channel
(MAC) phase, the messages are mapped to n-dimensional
real-valued codewords U and V respectively, and transmitted
simultaneously to R, who receives
W = h1U+ h2V + Z. (1)
Here h1, h2 ∈ R, and Z is additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) with variance σ2. The relay computes an integer-
linear combination of the messages, k1X⊕k2Y , and forwards
this to the user nodes in an ensuing broadcast phase. If q
does not divide k2 (resp. k1), then A (resp. B) can recover Y
(resp. X). In this paper, we will be concerned only with the
MAC phase, i.e., we only want to ensure that the relay can
compute the integer-linear combination k1X ⊕ k2Y . In fact,
by restricting ourselves to the MAC phase, we can consider
the more general problem where the messages X and Y are
uniformly distributed over a finite Abelian group G, with ⊕
denoting addition in G, and the relay must be able to compute
an integer-linear combination k1X ⊕ k2Y . Here, we use the
notation k1X to denote the sum of X with itself k1 − 1
times, i.e., 2X = X ⊕ X , 3X = X ⊕ X ⊕ X , and so on.
Likewise, k2Y denotes the sum of Y with itself k2− 1 times.
All our results will hold for this general case where R wants to
compute k1X⊕k2Y , where X and Y are uniformly distributed
over a finite Abelian group G.
We impose the additional constraint that R must not get any
information about the individual messages. Specifically, we
address the problem under two measures of security:
(S1) Perfect secrecy: The received vector is independent of the
individual messages, i.e., W ⊥ X and W ⊥ Y .
(S2) Strong secrecy: The information leaked by W about the
individual messages must be vanishingly small for large
n, i.e., limn→∞ I(X ;W) = limn→∞ I(Y ;W) = 0
The secure bidirectional relaying problem was first studied
in [4] and subsequently in [5], where the authors gave a
strongly-secure scheme for the case h1 = h2 = 1 using
lattice codes and randomization using universal hash functions.
This was later studied by [9], who gave a coding scheme
(also for h1 = h2 = 1) for secrecy using nested lattice
codes and randomization using probability mass functions
(pmfs) obtained by sampling well-chosen probability density
functions (pdfs). It was shown that using a pmf obtained by
sampling the Gaussian density, strong secrecy can be obtained
(a technique that was first used for the Gaussian wiretap
channel in [6]). It was also shown in [9] that by choosing a
density function having a compactly supported characteristic
function, even perfect secrecy can be achieved.
In this paper, we extend the results of [9], and make an
attempt to study the robustness of the schemes presented there.
In a practical scenario, the user nodes may not know h1 and
h2 exactly, since there is always an error in estimation of the
channel gains. In this paper, we assume that the user nodes do
not know the values of the channel gains h1 and h2. However,
the relay is assumed to know h1 and h2 exactly. We want to
know if it is still possible to achieve security in this situation.
We split the analysis into two parts: (1) the case when h1/h2
is irrational, and (2) when h1/h2 is rational. We will see that
no lattice-based coding scheme can guarantee secrecy in case
(1), and find sufficient conditions to guarantee perfect/strong
security in the latter case.
If h1/h2 is rational, then we can express h1 = hl1 and
h2 = hl2 for some real number h and co-prime integers l1
and l2. Therefore, in the first few sections, we will assume
that the channel gains h1 and h2 are co-prime integers, but
are unknown to both users, and that (k1, k2) = (h1, h2). We
want to ensure that the relay can securely compute k1X⊕k2Y .
In the specific case of the bidirectional relay problem, we can
choose G = Fmq to ensure that the user nodes can recover
the desired messages from k1X ⊕ k2Y . Note that if G is an
arbitrary finite Abelian group, then it is not guaranteed that one
can recover X (resp. Y ) given Y (resp. X) and k1X ⊕ k2Y .
The relay also needs to forward h1, h2 to the users in the
broadcast phase to ensure message recovery, since the users
have no knowledge of the channel gains prior to the broadcast
phase.
We will mostly study the noiseless scenario, i.e., the relay
receives W = h1U+ h2V, and find conditions under which
our scheme achieves security. The problem therefore is to
ensure secure computation of k1X ⊕ k2Y from k1U + k2V.
We can see that if the order of X divides k1, then k1X⊕k2Y
is simply k2Y , and confidentiality of the message Y is lost.
We will therefore make the assumption that the order of no
element of G divides k1 or k2. We will also briefly discuss
achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise, but without
any proofs.
We remark that demanding security in the noiseless scenario
is a much stronger condition. Since the additive noise Z
is independent of everything else, X → h1U + h2V →
h1U+h2V+Z forms a Markov chain, and hence, I(X ;h1U+
h2V + Z) ≤ I(X ;h1U + h2V). Therefore, any scheme
that achieves perfect/strong secrecy in the noiseless setting
also continues to achieve the same in presence of noise.
Furthermore, such a scheme has the added advantage that
security is achieved irrespective of the distribution on Z, and
even when this distribution is unknown to the users.
The paper is organized as follows: The coding scheme
is described in Section II-A. We discuss perfect secrecy in
Section III, and Theorem 2 gives sufficient conditions for
achieving perfect security with integral channel gains. Strong
secrecy is studied in Section IV, and Theorem 5 gives suf-
ficient conditions for achieving strong secrecy with integral
channel gains. In Section V, we discuss the case where the
channel gains are not integral and co-prime, and conclude with
some final remarks.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We use the notation followed in [9]. For the basic definitions
and results related to lattices, see, e.g., [2], [9]. Given a lattice
Λ, the fundamental Voronoi region is denoted by V(Λ). The
Fourier dual lattice of Λ is defined as Λˆ := {x ∈ Rn : 〈x,y〉 ∈
2πZ ∀y ∈ Λ}. If A and B are subsets of Rn, then A+ B :=
{x+ y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B} denotes their Minkowski sum. Also,
for x ∈ Rn and a, b ∈ R, ax+ bB := {ax+ by : y ∈ B}.
A. The coding scheme
A (Λ,Λ0, f) coding scheme is defined by the following
components: a pair of nested lattices (Λ,Λ0) in Rn, where
Λ0 ⊂ Λ, and a well chosen continuous pdf f over Rn. We
assume that h1 and h2 are integers, and (k1, k2) = (h1, h2).
• Lattices: The nested lattices Λ and Λ0 are chosen such
that Λ/Λ0 is isomorphic to G. To ensure that the user
nodes can recover the desired messages from k1X⊕k2Y ,
we could choose Λ and Λ0 to be nested Construction-A
lattices [2] over Fq for a prime q. Specifically, we could
choose a Λ constructed from an linear code C of length n
and dimension m1, and Λ0 from an linear code C0 having
length n and dimension m0, with C0 ⊂ C. If m := m1−
m0, then there exists a group isomorphism from Λ/Λ0
to Fmq [7]. Furthermore, one can recover X (resp. Y )
from k1X ⊕ k2Y if Y (resp. X) is known, provided that
q does not divide h1 or h2. However, we will prove our
results on secure computation of k1X⊕k2Y for the more
general case where Λ and Λ0 are arbitrary n-dimensional
nested lattices and G ∼= Λ/Λ0.
• Messages: The messages are chosen uniformly at random
from G. Since Λ/Λ0 ∼= G, each message can be identified
by a coset of Λ0 in Λ. We also define M := |G|, and the
rate of the code is R = 1n log2M .
• Encoding: Given a message/coset x ∈ G, node A trans-
mits a vector u ∈ Rn with probability
pU|x(u) =
{
f(u)∑
u
′∈x f(u
′) , if u ∈ x
0, otherwise.
(2)
Likewise, B transmits v ∈ y with probability pV|y(v).
The scheme can satisfy an average power constraint:
1
nE‖U‖2 = 1nE‖V‖2 ≤ P .
• Decoding: The relay finds the closest point in Λ to the
received vector w, and determines h1X ⊕ h2Y to be the
coset to which this point belongs.
We are mainly interested in two kinds of pdfs f over Rn:
• Density with a compactly supported characteristic func-
tion for perfect secrecy: Let ψ be the characteristic
function corresponding to f . Let R(ψ) be the support of
ψ, i.e., the region where ψ is nonzero. We will show that
for certain values of (h1, h2), if R(ψ) is supported within
a certain compact subset of Rn, then perfect secrecy can
be obtained.
• The Gaussian density for strong secrecy: For x,w ∈ Rn
and P > 0, we define
g−x,√P (w) =
1
(2πP )n/2
e−
‖w−x‖2
2P ,
and g−x,√P (Λ) =
∑
w∈Λ g−x,√P (w). For ease of no-
tation, we will use g√P (w) and g√P (Λ) instead of
g
0,
√
P (w) and g0,√P (Λ) respectively. We will show that
if Λ0 satisfies certain properties, then with f = g√P , we
can obtain strong secrecy.
We say that a rate R is achievable with perfect (resp. strong)
secrecy using our scheme if there exist (Λ,Λ0, f) coding
scheme having rate R such that (S1) (resp. (S2)) is satisfied,
and the probability of error of decoding h1X ⊕ h2Y at the
relay goes to 0 as n→∞.
III. PERFECT SECRECY WITH INTEGRAL CHANNEL GAINS
A. The noiseless case
In this section and the next, we assume that h1 and h2
are co-prime integers, and (k1, k2) = (h1, h2). A key tool
in studying the scheme for perfect security is the following
lemma from [9], which we reproduce here:
Lemma 1 (Proposition 5, [9]). Let x ∈ Rn. Let f be a pdf over
Rn such that the corresponding characteristic function, ψ, is
compactly supported within V(Λˆ). Then, φ(t) :=∑
u∈Λˆ ψ(t+
u)e−i〈x,u〉 is the characteristic function of a random vector
supported within Λ + x, and having pmf
p(u) =
{
vol(V(Λ))f(u) if u ∈ Λ + x
0 otherwise.
In other words, if ψ is compactly supported within V(Λˆ),
then φ(t) is the characteristic function corresponding to the
pmf obtained by sampling and normalizing f over Λ + x.
Given message (coset) x, user A transmits a random point
U in the coset x according to distribution pU|x as given by
(2), and given message y at B, the user transmits V in the
coset y according to distribution pV|y(v). The density f from
which these pmfs are sampled from is compactly supported
within R(ψ). The following result gives sufficient conditions
under which perfect security is achieved.
Theorem 2. If the order of no nonzero element of Λ/Λ0
divides h1 or h2, and R(ψ) is contained within the interior of
2V(Λˆ0)
|h1|+|h2| , then (h1U+ h2V) ⊥ X and (h1U+ h2V) ⊥ Y .
If Λ and Λ0 are Construction-A lattices obtained from linear
codes over Fq, then the order of no nonzero element of Λ/Λ0
divides h1 or h2 iff q does not divide h1 or h2.
We can choose a characteristic function ψ which is sup-
ported within a ball of radius r = αrpack(Λˆ0) (α ≤ 1),
where rpack(Λˆ0) denotes the packing radius of Λˆ0. Such
characteristic functions indeed exist, and the interested reader
is directed to [9] for examples. If r < 2rpack(Λˆ0)/(|h1|+|h2|),
then we certainly have R(ψ) ⊂ 2V(Λˆ0)/(|h1|+ |h2|), which
guarantees perfect secrecy. Therefore, perfect secrecy can be
attained for all h1, h2 that have the order of no element of G
as a divisor, and 2/(|h1|+ |h2|) > α. An interesting point to
note at this juncture is that the nested lattice pair does not have
to satisfy any additional properties in order to obtain perfect
secrecy. The above result holds for any pair of nested lattices,
and for any value of the dimension n, unlike most results on
secrecy which usually require the lattices to satisfy special
properties and n to be sufficiently large.
Proof of Theorem 2: Fix any x, y ∈ G. We want to
show that ph1U+h2V|x = ph1U+h2V, and ph1U+h2V|y =
ph1U+h2V. We only prove the first statement here, and the
second can be proved analogously. Let ψ be the characteristic
function corresponding to f , and φh1U|x be the characteristic
function of h1U conditioned on X = x. Furthermore, let φh1U
and φh2V be the characteristic functions of h1U and h2V
respectively. We will show that φh1U|xφh2V = φh1Uφh2V.
Let x be the coset representative of x within V(Λ0). Using
Lemma 1, we have
φh1U(t) =
∑
λ∈Λˆ
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h1|
)
, φh2V(t) =
∑
λ∈Λˆ
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h2|
)
,
and
φh1U|x(t) =
∑
λ∈Λˆ0
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h1|
)
e−i〈λ,x〉.
Since Λ0 ⊂ Λ, we have Λˆ ⊂ Λˆ0. Using this, and the fact that
〈λ,x〉 ∈ 2πZ for λ ∈ Λˆ, we can write
φh1U|x(t) = φh1U(t) +
∑
λ∈Λˆ0\Λˆ
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h1|
)
e−i〈λ,x〉 (3)
Therefore, φh1U|x(t)φh2V(t) = φh1U(t)φh2V(t) is equiva-
lent to
φh2V(t)
∑
λ∈Λˆ0\Λˆ
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h1|
)
e−i〈λ,x〉 = 0,
or
∑
λ′∈Λˆ
ψ
(
λ′ + t
|h2|
) ∑
λ∈Λˆ0\Λˆ
ψ
(
λ+ t
|h1|
)
e−i〈λ,x〉

 = 0.
It is enough to show that for every λ1 ∈ Λˆ0 \ Λˆ, λ2 ∈ Λˆ, and
t ∈ Rn, ψ
(
λ1+t
|h1|
)
ψ
(
λ2+t
|h2|
)
= 0. Observe that
Supp
(
ψ
(
λ1 + t
|h1|
))
=
R(ψ) − λ1
|h1| ,
and
Supp
(
ψ
(
λ2 + t
|h2|
))
=
R(ψ) − λ2
|h2| .
We will show that for every λ1 ∈ Λˆ0 \ Λˆ and λ2 ∈ Λˆ,
Supp
(
ψ
(
λ2 + t
|h2|
))⋂
Supp
(
ψ
(
λ1 + t
|h1|
))
= {},
or equivalently,(R(ψ) − λ1
|h1|
)⋂(R(ψ)− λ2
|h2|
)
= {},
where {} denotes the empty set.
Let us assume the contrary, that there exist t1, t2 in R(ψ),
λ1 ∈ Λˆ0 \ Λˆ and λ2 ∈ Λˆ such that t1−λ1|h1| = t2−λ2|h2| . This can
be rewritten as
|h2|t1 − |h1|t2 = |h2|λ1 − |h1|λ2. (4)
Clearly, |h2|t1−|h1|t2 lies in (|h2|+|h1|)R(ψ), which is con-
tained in the interior of 2V(Λˆ0). Since |h2|λ1 − |h1|λ2 ∈ Λˆ0,
the requirement (4) can be satisfied only if |h2|λ1− |h1|λ2 =
0. To complete the proof, we will obtain a contradiction by
showing that this quantity must in fact be nonzero. To this
end, we write λ1 = λ(0)1 +λ
(1)
1 , where λ
(0)
1 ∈ Λˆ0 ∩V(Λˆ), and
λ
(1)
1 ∈ Λˆ. Therefore, |h2|λ(1)1 −|h1|λ2 ∈ Λˆ. Since λ1 ∈ Λˆ0\Λˆ,
we are assured that λ(0)1 is nonzero. Using the quotient group
duality property of orthogonal subgroups, it can be shown that
the quotient group Λˆ0/Λˆ is isomorphic to Λ/Λ0 [3]. Now, we
have assumed that the order of no nonzero element of Λ/Λ0
divides h1 or h2. Therefore, the order of no nonzero element
of Λˆ0/Λˆ divides h1 or h2. Hence, [|h2|λ(0)1 ] mod Λˆ 6= 0;
in particular, this means that |h2|λ(0)1 ∈ Λˆ0 \ Λˆ. We can
therefore say that |h2|λ1 − |h1|λ2 ∈ Λˆ0 \ Λˆ, from which the
desired contradiction follows. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
B. Achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise
We choose ψ to be a characteristic function supported within
a ball of radius r = αrpack(Λˆ0), as discussed in Section III-A.
For a given Λ0, it can be shown that the average transmit
power can be made no less than nr2 (1 + o(1)), where o(1)→
0 as n → ∞. See, e.g., [9] for more details, and for the
explicit form of the characteristic function that achieves this
minimum. The following theorem can be proved analogously
to [9, Theorem 1].
Theorem 3. Let (Λ,Λ0) be a pair of nested lattices such that
Λ0 is good for covering, Λˆ0 is good for packing, and Λ is
good for AWGN channel coding1. Let ψ be supported within
a ball of radius r = αrpack(Λˆ0). Then, a rate of 12 log2 α
2P
σ2 −
log2(2e), is achievable with perfect secrecy as long as no
nonzero element of Λ/Λ0 has order which divides either h1
or h2, and 2/(|h1|+ |h2|) > α.
IV. STRONG SECRECY WITH INTEGRAL CHANNEL GAINS
A. The noiseless case
To obtain strong secrecy, we use the pmf obtained by
sampling the Gaussian density, i.e., f = g√P in (2). For θ > 0,
the flatness factor, ǫΛ(θ), is defined as [6]
ǫΛ(θ) = max
x∈V(Λ)
|vol(V(Λ)) gx,θ(Λ)− 1| .
This parameter will be used to bound the mutual information
between the individual messages and W. The following prop-
erties of ǫΛ will be useful in the remainder of the paper:
1For definitions of various goodness properties of lattices, see e.g. [2].
Lemma 4 ([6]). For every z ∈ Rn and θ > 0, we have
gz,θ(Λ)
gθ(Λ)
∈
[
1− ǫΛ(θ)
1 + ǫΛ(θ)
, 1
]
Furthermore, for every κ ≥ θ and a > 0, we have ǫΛ(θ) ≥
ǫΛ(κ), and ǫaΛ(aθ) = ǫΛ(θ).
We will show that if a certain flatness factor of Λ0 is
asymptotically vanishing in n, then we can obtain strong
secrecy. Specifically,
Theorem 5. Let ǫ := ǫΛ0
(√
P
h21+h
2
2
)
. If ǫ < 1/16e, and
Λ/Λ0 has no nonzero element whose order divides h1 or h2,
then
I(X ;h1U+ h2V) ≤ 16ǫ
3
(
log2 |G| − log2
(
16ǫ
3
))
.
In most communication problems, we would like to have
|G| growing exponentially in the dimension n. In such a
scenario, it is sufficient to have ǫ = o(1/n) to ensure that
I(X ;h1U + h2V) → 0 and I(Y ;h1U + h2V) → 0 as
n → ∞, and thus guaranteeing strong secrecy. In fact,
there exist Construction-A lattices for which the flatness
factor ǫΛ0(θ) goes to zero exponentially in n for all θ that
satisfies vol(V(Λ0)) < 2πθ2 [6] (also called secrecy-good
lattices). Suppose we choose Λ0 which is secrecy-good, and
vol(V(Λ0)) < 2πα2P for some α < 1. Then, I(X ;W)
and I(Y ;W) can be driven to zero exponentially in n for
all co-prime h1, h2 that satisfy 1/(h21 + h22) > α2, thereby
ensuring strong secrecy. Unlike the scheme of Section III
which guaranteed perfect secrecy for any pair of nested
lattices, this scheme requires Λ0 to be secrecy-good to obtain
strong security. Before we prove Theorem 5, we state the
following technical lemmas.
Lemma 6. Let Λ be a lattice in Rn, and k1, k2 be co-prime
integers. Then, {k1u+ k2v : u,v ∈ Λ} = Λ.
Proof: Clearly, {k1u + k2v : u,v ∈ Λ} ⊆ Λ. The
converse, Λ ⊆ {k1u + k2v : u,v ∈ Λ} can be proved using
the fact that ∃m, l ∈ Z such that k1m+ k2l = 1 if k1, k2 are
co-prime, and mx, lx ∈ Λ for x ∈ Λ.
Lemma 7. Let k1, k2 be co-prime integers, and w1,w2 ∈ Rn.
If w2 − w1 /∈ Λ, then (k1Λ + w1) ∩ (k2Λ + w2) is empty.
Otherwise, there exists some w′ ∈ Rn so that (k1Λ + w1) ∩
(k2Λ +w2) = k1k2Λ +w
′.
Proof: Define w = w2−w1. We can write (k1Λ+w1)∩
(k2Λ+w2) = (k1Λ∩(k2Λ+w))+w1. If w /∈ Λ, then clearly
(k1Λ) ∩ (k2Λ +w) = {}.
Now suppose that w ∈ Λ. We can write w = k1u + k2v
for some u,v ∈ Λ. We will prove that (k1Λ) ∩ (k2Λ+w) =
k1k2Λ+k1u. Since k2Λ+w = k2Λ+k1u, we have k1k2Λ+
k1u ⊆ k2Λ + w. Since we also have k1k2Λ + k1u ⊆ k1Λ,
we can say that (k1k2Λ + k1u) ⊆ (k1Λ) ∩ (k2Λ + w). To
complete the proof, we need to show that (k1Λ)∩(k2Λ+w) ⊆
(k1k2Λ + k1u).
For every λ ∈ (k1Λ)∩ (k2Λ+w) = (k1Λ)∩ (k2Λ+ k1u),
there exist x,y ∈ Λ so that λ = k1x = k2y + k1u. In other
words, λ − k1u = k1(x − u) = k2y. Hence, λ − k1u ∈
k1Λ ∩ k2Λ. We now claim that since k1 and k2 are co-prime
integers, k1Λ ∩ k2Λ = k1k2Λ. Clearly, k1k2Λ ⊆ k1Λ ∩ k2Λ.
Let G be a generator matrix for Λ. For every x ∈ k1Λ∩ k2Λ,
there exist x1,x2 ∈ Zn so that x = k1Gx1 = k2Gx2. In
other words, k1x1 = k2x2, which implies that x1 ∈ k2Zn,
and x2 ∈ k1Zn since k1, k2 are co-prime. Hence, x ∈ k1k2Λ,
and k1Λ ∩ k2Λ ⊆ k1k2Λ. Therefore, λ − k1u ∈ k1k2Λ, or
λ ∈ k1k2Λ+k1u. Hence, (k1Λ)∩(k2Λ+w) ⊆ (k1k2Λ+k1u).
This completes the proof.
Fix any coset (message) x ∈ G. Let W := h1U + h2V.
We define the variational distance between pW and pW|x to
be
V(pW, pW|x) :=
∑
w∈Λ
|pW(w)− pW|x(w)|,
and the average variational distance as
V :=
1
M
∑
x∈G
V(pW, pW|x).
To prove the theorem, we will find an upper bound on
the average variational distance, and then bound the mutual
information using the average variational distance. Recall that
ǫ = ǫΛ0
(√
P/(h21 + h
2
2)
)
.
Lemma 8. If ǫ < 1/2, and Λ/Λ0 has no nonzero element
whose order divides h1 or h2, then for every x ∈ Λ/Λ0, we
have
V(pW, pW|x) ≤ 16ǫ.
Proof: Let x and y respectively denote the (unique) coset
representatives of x and y in Λ ∩ V(Λ0). We have
pW|x,y(w) =
∑
u∈h1Λ0+h1x
ph1U|x(u)ph2V|y(w − u). (5)
The supports of ph1U|x and ph2V|y are h1Λ0 + h1x and
h2Λ0 + h2y respectively. Hence, ph1U|x(u)ph2V|y(w− u) is
nonzero iff u ∈ (h1Λ0 + h1x) and w − u ∈ (h2Λ0 + h2y),
or equivalently, if u ∈ (h1Λ0 + h1x) ∩ (h2Λ0 − h2y + w).
Using Lemma 7, we have
(h1Λ0 + h1x) ∩ (h2Λ0 − h2y +w)
=
{
h1h2Λ0 +w
′ if w ∈ Λ0 + h1x+ h2y
{} otherwise. (6)
for some w′ ∈ Rn. We can therefore conclude that the support
of pW|x,y is Λ0 + h1x+ h2y. Since the order of no nonzero
element of Λ/Λ0 divides h2, we have [h2y] mod Λ0 6= 0 if
[y] mod Λ0 6= 0. We are therefore assured that if Λ0+y1 and
Λ0 + y2 are two distinct cosets of Λ0 in Λ, then Λ0 + h2y1
and Λ0+h2y2 are also distinct. Therefore, ∪y∈Λ∩V(Λ0)(Λ0+
h2y) = Λ, and hence ∪y(Λ0 + h1x + h2y) = Λ. Thus, we
can conclude that the support of pW|x is Λ.
Substituting for ph1U|x, ph2V|y in (5) and using this in
pW|x(w) =
∑
y∈G
1
M pW|x,y, we get
pW|x(w) =
∑
y∈G
∑
u∈h1h2Λ0+w′
e
− ‖u‖2
2h2
1
P
− ‖w−u‖2
2h2
2
P
ξ
(7)
where
ξ := M(2πh1h2P )
ng−h1x,h1
√
P (h1Λ0)g−h2y,h2
√
P (h2Λ0).
The remainder of the proof follows that of [9, Theorem 18],
and we only give an outline. A simple calculation tells us that
e
− ‖u‖2
2h21P
− ‖w−u‖2
2h22P = e
(
− ‖w‖2
2P(h21+h
2
2)
− (h
2
1+h
2
2)
2P (h21h
2
2)
∥∥∥∥u− h
2
1w
h21+h
2
2
∥∥∥∥
2)
.
Let h := h1h2/
√
h21 + h
2
2, and k :=
√
h21 + h
2
2. Using this
and the above equation in (7), and simplifying, we get
pW|x(w) = e
− ‖w‖2
2k2P
∑
y∈G
∑
u∈h1h2Λ0+w′
−h2w/h22
e−
1
2h2P
‖u‖2
ξ
Let us define t := w′ − (h2/h22)w. The above equation can
be simplified to
pW|x(w) =
1
M
∑
y∈G
gk
√
P (w)
g−h1x,h1
√
P (h1Λ0)
g−t,h√P (h1h2Λ0)
g−h2y,h2
√
P (h2Λ0)
Using Lemma 4, we can show that ǫh1h2Λ0
(√
h21h
2
2P
h21+h
2
2
)
=
ǫΛ0
(√
P
h21+h
2
2
)
= ǫ, and also from Lemma 4,
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
≤ g−t,h
√
P (h1h2Λ0)
gh
√
P (h1h2Λ0)
≤ 1.
Similarly,
1− ǫΛ0(
√
P )
1 + ǫΛ0(
√
P )
≤ g−h1x,h1
√
P (h1Λ0)
gh1
√
P (h1Λ0)
≤ 1.
Since
√
h21 + h
2
2 > 1, we have ǫΛ0(
√
P ) ≤ ǫ. Using this, and
the fact that (1−x)/(1+x) is a decreasing function of x, we
have
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
≤ g−h1x,h1
√
P (h1Λ0)
gh1
√
P (h1Λ0)
≤ 1.
Let us define
p(w) =
1
M
∑
y∈G
gk
√
P (w)
gh1
√
P (h1Λ0)
gh
√
P (h1h2Λ0)
g−h2y,h2
√
P (h2Λ0)
,
which is a function independent of x. We can therefore say
that
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
p(w) ≤ pW|x(w) ≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫp(w). (8)
Since p(w) does not depend on x, we can use the above to
bound pW(w) = 1M
∑
x pW|x(w) in the same manner, and
obtain
∑
w∈Λ |pW|x(w) − pW(w)| ≤ 4ǫ(1−ǫ)2 . Using the fact
that ǫ < 1/2, we get V(pW, pW|x) ≤ 16ǫ, thus completing
the proof.
We now have all the necessary tools to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5: If ǫ < 1/2, we have V(pW, pW|x) ≤
16ǫ from Lemma 8. Since this is true for every x ∈ Λ∩V(Λ0),
we also have V ≤ 16ǫ. We can then use [Lemma 1, [1]], which
says that if |G| > 4, then I(W;X) ≤ V(log2 |G| − log2V).
Since −x log x is an increasing function of x for x < 1/e,
we can use the upper bound of 16ǫ for V if ǫ < 1/16e. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
B. Achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise
As remarked in the previous section, we choose Λ0 so that
the flatness factor ǫΛ0(α
√
P ) goes to zero exponentially in
n, for some α ≤ 1. The following statement can be proved
analogously to [9, Theorem 16]:
Theorem 9. If Λ0 is good for MSE quantization and secrecy-
good, and Λ is good for AWGN channel coding, then the
average transmit power converges to P , and any rate less than
1
2 log2
α2P
σ2 − 12 log2 e can be achieved with strong secrecy as
long as the order of no nonzero element of Λ/Λ0 divides h1
or h2, and 1/(h21 + h22) ≥ α2.
V. DISCUSSION
So far, we studied the case where h1 and h2 were co-
prime integers. This can easily be extended to the general
case where h1/h2 is rational. We can express h1 = hk1 and
h2 = hk2 for some h ∈ R and co-prime integers k1 and k2.
Then, it is easy to show that perfectly (resp. strongly) secure
computation of k1X ⊕ k2Y can be performed at the relay as
long as the order of no nonzero element of Λ/Λ0 divides k1 or
k2, and 2/(|k1|+|k2|) > α
(
resp. 1/(k21+k22) ≥ α2
)
. Further-
more, the achievable rate is given by 12 log2
h2α2P
σ2 − log2(2e)(
resp. 12 log2
h2α2P
σ2 − 12 log2 e
)
.
A. Irrational channel gains
We now make the observation that if h1 and h2 are nonzero
and h1/h2 is irrational, then the relay can uniquely recover
the individual messages if the channel is noiseless.
Proposition 10. Suppose that h1, h2 are nonzero, and h1/h2
is irrational. Let Λ be a full-rank lattice in Rn. Then, for every
u,v ∈ Λ, w = h1u+ h2v uniquely determines (u,v).
Proof: Consider any u1,u2,v1,v2 ∈ Λ that satisfy
h1u1 + h2v1 = h1u2 + h2v2. If A is a (full-rank) generator
matrix of Λ, then we can write u1 = AT u˜1, u2 = AT u˜2,
v1 = A
T v˜1, and v2 = AT v˜2, where u˜1, u˜2, v˜1, and v˜2 belong
to Zn. Therefore, h1(u˜1 − u˜2) = h2(v˜2 − v˜1). For j = 1, 2,
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let u˜j(i) and v˜j(i) denote the ith components
of u˜j and v˜j respectively. Now suppose that u1 6= u2. Then,
there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that u˜1(i) 6= u˜2(i).
Rearranging h1(u˜1(i) − u˜2(i)) = h2(v˜2(i) − v˜1(i)), we get
h1
h2
= v˜2(i)−v˜1(i)u˜1(i)−u˜2(i) . However, the right hand side is clearly a
rational number, which contradicts our hypothesis of h1/h2
being irrational. Therefore, u1 = u2. Similarly, v1 = v2.
For our lattice-based scheme to achieve perfect/strong se-
crecy it is therefore necessary that h1/h2 be rational, in which
case we can write h1 = hk1 and h2 = hk2 for some
h ∈ R and co-prime integers k1 and k2. In addition to this,
no element of Λ/Λ0 can have its order dividing k1 or k2 if
we want to achieve security. While we have seen that the
second requirement is sufficient to guarantee perfect/strong
secrecy, we also claim that it is also a necessary condition
for perfect secrecy. To see why this is the case, recall that we
want pk1U+k2V|x = pk1U+k2V for all x ∈ Λ/Λ0. For this, the
supports of the two pmfs must be the same. While the support
of pk1U+k2V|x is k1Λ0+k2Λ+k1x, the support of pk1U+k2V
is k1Λ + k2Λ = Λ (since gcd(k1, k2) = 1). We can write
k1Λ0+k2Λ+k1x = ∪y∈Λ∩V(Λ0)(k1Λ0+k2Λ0+k1x+k2y) =
∪y∈Λ∩V(Λ0)(Λ0 + k1x + k2y). If the order of some element
of Λ/Λ0 divides k2, then we can argue using the pigeon hole
principle that ∪y∈Λ∩V(Λ0)(Λ0 + k1x+ k2y) 6= Λ, and hence,
perfect secrecy is not obtained. This justifies our claim.
The requirement of h1/h2 being rational to obtain security
may appear discouraging for a practical scenario, where the
channel gains are almost surely irrational. However, we must
note that we have used a rather pessimistic model for the
system. In practice, the user nodes do have a rough estimate of
the channel gains, and the channel is noisy. While it may not be
possible to achieve perfect security even in presence of noise
when the channel gains are irrational unknown to the user
nodes, we may hope to achieve strong secrecy. We observed
that if we proceed along the lines of Lemma 8, strong secrecy
can be achieved if the flatness factors ǫΛ0
(√
h2
i
Pσ2
h2
i
P+σ2
)
=
o(1/n) for i = 1, 2. To achieve this, we could use a secrecy-
good lattice scaled so that vol(V(Λ0)) < 2π h
2
i
Pσ2
h2
i
P+σ2
for
i = 1, 2. However, it turns out that this is in conflict with
the requirement of reliable decoding of X and Y , for which
we need vol(V(Λ)) to be greater than 2πe h2iPσ2
h2
i
P+σ2
. Hence,
it seems that a different approach is required to tackle this
problem.
Before concluding the paper, we make a final remark.
Although the scheme presented in Section II-A may not be
optimal if the channel gains are not known exactly at the
user nodes, we demonstrate that there is a scheme with which
security can be obtained in such a scenario.
B. Co-operative jamming: Security using Gaussian jamming
signals
We can use the following four-stage amplify-and-forward
bidirectional relaying strategy: In the first phase, user A
transmits its codeword U1, which is jammed by a Gaussian
random vector V1 generated by B. The relay simply scales
the received vector and sends it to B, who knows V1 and can
recover U1. The channel from A to B can be modeled as a
Gaussian wiretap channel, where R acts as the eavesdropper.
Using a wiretap code [6] for U, we can achieve strong secrecy.
User B similarly uses a wiretap code to transmit its message
to user A via R in the third and fourth phases.
A reasonable assumption to make is that the error in the
estimation of h1 and h2 at both user nodes is at most δ. To
keep things simple, let us assume that R simply forwards the
received signal to the users without scaling. At the end of the
second phase, B receives h1U1+h2V1+Z, where Z = Z1+
Z2 is the sum of the noise vectors accumulated in the first two
phases, and has variance σ21 + σ22 . Suppose that the estimates
of h1, h2 made by B are h′1 and h′2 respectively. Due to the
error in estimation, there would be a residual component of V
remaining even after the jamming signal has been removed.
Therefore, B “sees” an effective channel of h′1U1+ZB , where
the effective noise is ZB = (h1− h′1)U1 +(h2− h′2)V1 +Z.
On the other hand, R “sees” the effective channel h1U1 +
Z′, where Z′ = Z1 + h2V1. It can be shown that [6] using
the lattice Gaussian distribution for randomization, i.e., pU1|X
given by (2) with f = g√P , a rate of 14 log2
(
1 +
h21P
2δ2P+σ2
)
−
1
4 log2
(
1 +
h21P
h22P+σ
2
1
)
− 12 log2 e can be achieved by A with
strong secrecy. In fact, the rate can be slightly improved by
using a modulo-and-forward scheme [10] instead of the simple
amplify-and-forward scheme for relaying.
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